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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
thereto" only and that the husband should not be deprived of a right
without compensation except by specific statutory wording.28
Workmen's compensation is primarily intended "to provide residents
... with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and
to place on . . . employers a limited and determinate liability."291 The
majority rule, followed in the instant case and in a recent Ohio case"0 also
inspired by the Hitaffer case, accomplishes the second end of compensation
but offers no solution to the problem of maintaining adequate relief to the
employee in the face of inflation." Admitting that the Hitaffer theory is a
haphazard and possibly unintended answer to the inflationary difficulties,
prompt legislative relief 32 still seems essential in order that judicial pity 3
may not be further tempted to warp the structure of workmen's compensa-
tion law.
34
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE-BREACH OF
IMPLIED WARRANTY
Decedent purchased and used a branded salt substitute from the de-
fendant. In a suit by decedent's administratrix under the wrongful death
statute' for breach of implied warranty of fitness, held, the statute will be
28. Id. at 70, 87 A.2d at 8.
29. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947). See Bradford
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932).
30. Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951) (action
for loss of consortium barred).
31. " . . . most legislatures have failed to keep such compensation acts abreast of the
times and rising cost of living ..... ".Horovitz, The Injured Worker's Plight, 2
N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 11, 16 (1948).
32. One legislative remedy is simply repeated adjustment of the compensation rates.
By the English statute, the employee retains his common law right of action but can-
not receive both damages and compensation. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, 15
& 16 CEO. 5, c. 84, § 29(1). Under a more recent British statute, the damages in a tort
action are reduced by one-half the probable compensation, if any. Law Reform. (Personal
Injuries) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. 6, c. 41, § 2. In the United States, compensation acts
benefit employers in that they provide for a limited and determinable liability. See note
29 supra. The English act seems to have a different approach. Russell-Jones, Workmen's
Compensation: Common Law Remedies and the Beveridge Report,7 MoDEFRN LAW RV,-
viEw 13, 23-25 (1944).
Legislation could provide for automatic cost-of-living adjustments of compensation
rates. Compensation principally replaces wages lost and more than 3,000,000 wage-earners
in the United States are covered by contracts with so-called "escalator clauses." N. Y.
Times, March 22, 1952, p. 1, col. 4.
33. There is good and frequent opportunity for judicial pity. There are 2,000,000
employees injured annually, 18,000 deaths annually, and over 100,000 permanently
maimed. Horovitz, The Injured Worker's Plight, 2 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 11 (1948).
34. "1 should suppose that, like so many other questions, this was one of degree,
dependent as I have already suggested upon how far compensation, considering its cer-
tainty, could possibly be thought to be the equivalent of indemnity." See United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. R. It. Macy & Co., 156 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting
opinion b y L. Hand, 1.) (employee limited to trivial compensation by majority holding).
i. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1951).
CASES NOTED
interpreted to support actions ex delicto exclusively. Whitely v. Webb's
City Inc., 55 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1951).
Historically, no civil action could be maintained for the death of one
human being caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another. 2
This injustice was first corrected in England by the enactment of the Fatal
Accidents Act of 18463 which created a special right of action for a limited
class of the decedent's relatives.4 The content of this act has a counterpart
in most jurisdictions of the United States today.5  Usually these statutes
demand that the cause of action rest upon the wrongful act, negligence or
default of the defendant.6 This compels the plaintiff to show a duty owed
to the deceased and a breach of that duty by the defendant.' The mere
fact that a contract sets out the duty does not prevent suit under the
statute. 8
A conflict exists when courts are asked to consider whether a breach of
warranty is an actionable wrong per se within the statute? Prior to the
development of the action of assumpsit an action for breach of warranty
was an action on the case for deceit.' 0 Recognized authority today holds
that warranty actions are not based on negligence.1 Since the statute gen-
2. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530 (1933); Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877);
Flanders v. Georgia S. & F. Ry., 68 Fla. 479, 67 So. 68 (1914).
3. ST. 9 & 10 VIcr. c. 93 (1846j.
4. 17 IIALSBURY'S STATuTEs or ELCLAND 2 (2d ed. 1950).
5. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 635.9 (Supp. 1951); the Missouri act defines the
class of persons responsible and the means of death. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3652 (West
1942); N. Y. DxcFDE'r ESTATE LAw § 130; OxA. SArr. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (Supp.
1951 ); PURI ON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (Supp. 1951); PROSSER, TORTS § 103
(1941).
6. The Florida act follows this phrasing. ['LA. STAT. § 768.01 (1951). The orig-
inal Lord Campbell's act used the phrase "wrongful act, neglect or default." Sr. 9 & 10
V'ICT. c. 93 (1846).
7. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Smith, 160 Okla. 287, 16 P.2d 226 (1932); City of
Tulsa v. larnan, 148 Okla. 117, 299 Pac. 462 (1931); PRosseR, Towrs § 31 (1941);
17 IIALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 4 (2d ed. 1950).
8. Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1928) (action against physician
for wrongfully causing death); Randolph v. Snyder, 139 Ky. 159, 129 S.\V. 562 (1910);
Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 165 N.WV. 237 (1917) (failure of landlord to keep
leased premises heated); Braun v. Rcil, 40 S.V.2d 621 (Mo. 1931); Bloss v. Dr. R. S.
Woodson Sanitarium Co., 319 Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.2d 367 (1928); Roche v. St. John's
Riverside Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 160 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1916) aff'd, 176 App.
Div. 885, 161 N.Y. Supp. 1143 (2d dept. 1916) (when hospital failed to supervise
infant who died as a result of its head coming in contact with steam pipe).
9. Sterling Aluminum Products Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.
1944) (damages for death not recoverable for breach of warranty of a motor block
testing fluid); Burkhardt v. Arour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 AtI. 385 (1932) (con-
sumer's death held not allowable element of damages for dealer's breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness of corned beef); Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 17 So.2d
791 (1944) (poisonous coconut pie causing death is not "wrongful or negligent" act);
Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.H!. 365, 189 Atl. 865 (1937) (pork pie contamination is
breach of warranty, a contract action, not allowed under death statute); Howson v.
Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 175 Atd. 656 (1935); Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y.
26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
10. Ames, The History of Assunpsit, 2 HRV. L. REv. 15 (1888).
11. Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co,, 243 Mass. 243, 137 N.E. 371 (1922) (a buyer's
right to recover for breach of warranty in a sale of cold cream is not founded on negli-
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
erally supports actions ex delicto'2 a strict interpretation would preclude
warranty actions. An exceptional New York case looked beyond the pro-
cedural formula in the allegation, and held that recovery is not conditioned
upon definition but upon a clear legislative intent to effect a remedy if the
facts warranted it. 5
Commenting that a detour into the field of semantics was unnecessary,
the court in the instant case deemed the wording of the statute plain and
gave it strict interpretation. The dissent relied upon Greco v. Kresge, where
a breach of warranty of a pork product was held to be such a "default or
wrongful act" within the statute.1 4 Significantly, the instant case finds the
majority speculative as to whether there was a warranty of fitness of the salt
substitute for general usage: the Greco case presented no such doubt.
The majority of holdings on this issue strictly apply the statute, thus
excluding warranty actions tnder wrongful death statutes.' " It would appear
that the problem is really an examination of the nature and purpose of these
statutes. If the breach of warranty has the same legal effect as a breach of
tort duty, in those activities where absolute liability is imposed, then there
is little reason to deny recovery under the death statutes. The use of war-
ranty actions to circumvent the allegations and proof of negligence may be
of excellent tactical content, but the result may be tragic. When one has
elected to follow the comparatively open path of implied warranty we are
compelled to conclude that it leads outside the statute.'
gerce); I VILLISTON, SALES § 237 (3d ed. 1948); 5 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1506
(Rev. ed. 1937) (commenting that while decisions do allow warranty actions a remedy
in assumpsit, the courts recognize the fact that warranty is really a hybrid between tort
and contract).
12. See Braun v. Reil, 40 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1931); "Since under the common law
contract actions survived in favor of the plaintiff's representative while tort actions did
not, it seems reasonable to suppose that the wrongful death statutes were intended to
refer only to torts." PROSSErn, TORTS § 103 (1941).
13. Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938). It is interesting
to note that this case, the bellwether of liberal interpretation, was decided in a state
where, prior to the enactment of the Sales Act, recovery was limited to where process of
manufacture was improper or negligently carried on. The court did mention a presumed
knowledge of defect, thus evidencing the influence of the earlier New York law.
14. 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
15. Sterling Aluminum Products Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 791 (Sth Cir.
1944); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932); Hasson Gro-
cery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 17 So.2d 791 (1944); Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.H.
365, 189 Atl, 865 (1937); Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656
(1935); see Hinds v. Wheadon, 115 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1941), revd on other grounds, 19
Cal. 2d 458, 121 P.2d 724 (1942). Contra: Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26,
12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
16. Alexander, J., in Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 17 So.2d 791,
793 (1944).
